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Wang Yangming’s Notions of
Primary Knowledge and Primary Ability
Abstract
The paper first establishes that Wang Yangming’s 王陽明 (1472–1529) notion of primary 
knowledge (liangzhi 良知) does not entail subjective idealism but is rather related to the 
transcendental subjectivity in the phenomenological sense. Then, the paper discusses the 
question of whether Wang also has the concept of primary ability (liangneng 良能). The 
paper argues that it can be seen in two central topics of Wang: “knowledge and action are 
one” (zhixing	heyi 知行合一) and “regarding Heaven and Earth and myriad things as one 
(rhizomatic) body” (以天地萬物為一體) or considering them as “originally one with my 
(rhizomatic) body” (本吾一體). It is shown how primary knowledge and ability are two 
aspects of the same phenomenon. It is true on the level of the virtual “rhizomatic body” (ti 
體), not on the level of things considered as fully formed and actualized (xing	形), as they 
appear in the empirical mind, clouded by desires (yu	欲) that become fixated on the level of 
the actual. These desires can be discarded by the “extension of (primary) knowledge” zhi	
(liang)zhi	致(良)知. A parallel concept of “extension of (primary) ability” (zhi	liangneng	致






philosopher of the Ming 明	period	(1368–1644).	Half	a	millennium	earlier,	
during  the  Song 宋	dynasty	 (960	–	1279),	Confucianism	had	been	 revived	
after	a	long	dominance	of	Buddhism	and	Daoism	(it	somewhat	resembles	the	
revival	of	antiquity	during	the	European	Renaissance).1 This form of Confu-
cianism	(that	also	borrowed	heavily	from	Buddhism	and	Daoism)	 is	called	
Neo-Confucianism	 by	Western	 scholars.2	 There	 were	 different	 schools	 of	
Neo-Confucianism,	the	most	important	of	which	was	the	“school	of	veins” 3 
(li 理)	or	the	“school	of	Chengs	and	Zhu”,	founded	by	brothers	Cheng	程 and 
1   
This	 project	 was	 supported	 by	 the	 Estonian	
Research	 Council	 grant	 PRG319.	 I	 would	
also	like	to	thank	three	anonymous	reviewers	
who	gave	me	extremely	helpful	feedback	that	
helped to improve the draft. 
2   
For	questions	of	this	terminology,	see	Make-
ham	2010:	x–xiv.
3   
This	is	my	translation	of	li 理,	that	I	use	also	in	
an	article	on	Zhu	Xi	(Ott	2020).	This	term	has	
had	 a	 great	 variety	 of	 translations.	An	 older	
dominant	rendering	was	“principle”.	As	Wil-
lard	 Peterson	 (1986:	 22)	 notes,	 the	 problem	
is	 that	 “principle”	 is	 transcendent	 from	 the	
thing,	 it	 comes	 before	 and	 is	 separate	 from	
























































Wang Yangming 王陽明	 (1472–1529)	 is	famous	for	his	saying	that	outside	
























suitable	 term,	 both	 as	 internal	 coherence	 of	
the	thing	and	external	coherence	of	the	thing	
with	 other	 things.	This	 has	 become	 a	 newer	
standard for translating li.	Yet,	I	am	afraid	that	
it	overstresses	the	integration	part	of	the	con-
cept.	Oxford	 dictionary	 gives	 two	meanings	
for	“coherence”:	“the	quality	of	being	logical	
and	 consistent”	 and	 “the	 quality	 of	 forming	
a	 unified	 whole”.	The	Chinese	 authors	were	
not	 so	much	concerned	about	 a	 simple	 logi-





26–27;	 although	 a	 more	 correct	 etymology	
is  that  it  represents  a  village  li 里).	 It	 may	
be	useful	–	at	 least	 for	 experimentation	–	 to	
ground	an	abstract	concept	in	a	concrete	phe-













4   
There	are	 several	 interesting	comparisons	of	
Wang	Yangming	with	modern	 thinkers:	 e.g.,	





5	   
I	am	grateful	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	who	
asked	me	to	bring	out	the	general	focus	of	this	
paper,	 and	 pointed	 out	 these	 three	 aspects,	
with	which	I	indeed	agree.	
6	   
For	 an	 explanation	 of	 this	 term,	 see	 below,	
footnote 19.




































imminent	 future	 (protention)	 (see	Husserl	1991,	Zahavi	2003:	80–98).	The	
primal	 impression	of	 a	 certain	visual	 or	 auditive	perception	has	 among	 its	
protentions	slightly	different	perceptions	or	lack	thereof	(pitch	darkness,	si-
lence),	and	vice	versa,	a	primal	 impression	of	darkness	or	 silence	also	has	
on	 its	 protentional	 horizon	 full	 visual	 or	 auditive	perceptions.	Thus,	Wang	
Yangming	says:
“Before	the	bell	is	struck	[the	sound],	essentially	speaking,	startles	the	heaven	and	earth.	After	


































lation)	 the	heart-mind;	 it	 is	 the	“movement”	(dong 動)  of  the heart-mind.13 
The	 heart-mind	 itself,	 at	 the	 bottom,	 is	 not	 just	 empirical	 subjectivity,	 but	
transcendental.	
8	   
CXL	 is	Chuan xi lu 傳習錄,	 a	 collection	 of	
Wang	Yangming’s	writings,	dialogues	and	let-
ters.	The	number	 refers	 to	 the	section	of	 the	
text	 as	 found	 in	Wikisource:	 https://zh.wiki-
source.org/zh-hant/傳習錄	 (accessed	 on	 3	
February	 2020).	 WTC	 is	 Wing-tsit	 Chan’s	
translation	“Instructions	for	Practical	Living”	
(Wang	 1963)	 and	 the	 number	 refer	 to	 page	
numbers  in  that  edition  (Wade-Giles  roman-
ization	has	been	changed	into	pinyin).
9   
This	 idea	 is	not	even	in	contradiction	with	a	
finite	 astronomical	 space,	 because	 this	 per-
ceptual	possible	synthesis	is	still	supposed	to	
go	on	indefinitely,	only	that	at	a	certain	point	
I	may	be	back	 at	 the	 starting	point,	 like	 if	 I	
continue	 to	move	 straight	 ahead	 on	 the	 sur-
face	of	the	Earth,	then	after	40,000	km	I	will	
be	 back	 where	 I	 started	 from	 (although	 the	
comparison	is	not	exact,	because	the	universe	
expands,	but	Earth	does	not).
10	   
Of	 course,	 one	 can	 say	with	 John	Cage	 that	
there	 is	 no	 such	 thing	 as	 absolute	 silence,	
and	that	I	always	hear	something,	if	not	other	
things,	 then	 certain	 sounds	 from	my	 body’s	




doubtless	 that	 he	 did	 in	 fact	 experience	 two	
distinct	 sounds,	 whatever	 their	 cause.	 So,	
silence	 may	 be	 reinterpreted	 in	 Bergsonian	
terms	 (similarly	 to	 the	 way	 he	 reinterprets	 
 
“disorder”	 and	 “nothingness”,	 see	 Bergson	
1944:	 240–257	 and	 296–324),	 that	 it	 is	 the	
uninteresting	 background	 of	 the	 interesting	
(either in a positive or negative sense) sound. 
If	I	focus	on	the	musicians’	performance,	their	
music	is	the	“sound”	and	everything	else	is	a	










11   
This	idea	in	itself	is	not	new,	cf.	for	instance	
the	 phrase	 from	 the	 Guodian	 text	 “Nature	
from	Decree	Issues”	(Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自
命出):	“What	one	likes	and	what	one	dislikes,	
are	 things”	 (所好所惡，物也;  Middendorf  
2008:	152).
12   
“So,	Wang’s	wu	is	similar	to	Franz	Brentano’s	
intentional	object.”	(Lee	1987:	33)	–	“To	use	
the	 language	of	phenomenology,	yi  is  an  in-
tentional	act	in	the	widest	sense.”	(Jung	2011:	
44)
13   
Movement	in	the	sense	of	phenomenological	























with	 their	 specific	 modes	of	 appearance	 (we	 shall	 come	back	 to	 this	 topic	




the	original	substance	of	the	mind	(xin zhi benti 心之本體,	CXL	§152	WTC	
132),	that	it	is	(CXL	155)	absolutely	good,	broad	or	unrestricted	(kuoran 廓
然),	inclusive	(dagong 大公),	quiet	and	unmoving	(jiran budong 寂然不動), 
and	possessed	by	all	humans	(人人之所同具者).	Nothing	can	be	added	to	it	or	
subtracted	from	it.	It	is	the	“equilibrium	before	the	feelings	are	aroused/emit-
ted”	(weifa zhi zhong 未發之中,	a	phrase	from	the	classical	text	“Doctrine	of	
the	Mean”).
We	have	 to	differentiate	between	 two	aspects	of	 the	mind	 (although	Wang	
Yangming	emphasizes	that	they	cannot	be	separated).18
1.		One	is	mind’s	“original	substance”	or	“root	rhizomatical	body”	(benti 
本體).19	The	primary	knowledge	 characterizes	 it,	 it	 is	 the	 clearing	or	
Lichtung	that	enables	everything	that	appears,	to	appear	(see	Heidegger	
1971:	 54);20	 it	 is	 neither	 good	 nor	 bad,	 neither	 tranquil	 nor	moving,	
without	past	or	future;	a	state	before	the	emission	of	intentions	and	feel-
ings (weifa 未發);	holding	fast	to	the	“heavenly	veins”	(tianli 天理);	it	
is	bright	and	clear	(ming 明, zhao 照),	lively	or	nimble	(ling 靈), and 
like a mirror (jing 鏡).21






















14   
Wang	 Yangming’s	 “claim	 is	 quite	 far	 from	





15	   
Fung	Yiu-ming	 (2012)	 considers	 liangzhi as 
a spiritual emanation from human persons to 
the  universe,  and  brings  out  interesting  sim-
ilarities	with	 neo-Daoism.	However,	 at	 least	
for	philosophical	purposes,	I	find	the	compar-
ison	with	phenomenology	more	fruitful.	
16	   
Of	course,	the	“primary”	and	“secondary”	do	
not	refer	to	a	rank	in	value	but	to	a	distinction	
in	 derivation:	 secondary	 knowledge	 presup-
poses	primary	knowledge	as	its	foundation.
17	   
Wing-tsit	Chan	translates	it	as	“innate	knowl-
edge”,	 which	 is	 justified	 also	 by	 Mencius’	
saying	 (that	 introduced	 this	 philosophical	
concept,	 as	 we	 are	 going	 to	 see	 in	 the	 next	
section)	 that	 it	 is	 something	you	know	with-
out	learning,	and,	so,	one	would	think	that	this	
knowledge	must	be	innate.	However,	there	are	
several	 problems	 with	 this	 rendering.	 First,	
this	 term	 introduces	 an	 unnecessary	 conno-
tation	 from	 the	Western	 tradition,	 where	 the	
moderns	fought	over	whether	there	are	innate	
ideas	 (“rationalists”)	 or	 not	 (“empiricists”),	
whereas	 no	 such	 debate	 was	 held	 about	 the	
liangzhi.	 In	 fact,	 the	 question	was	 not	 about	
ideas	but	the	mind	itself	that	knows	them	(and	
in	 this	 sense	 also	 the	 empiricists	would	 con-
cede	 the	 existence	 of	 liangzhi,	 i.e.,	 the	 exis-
tence	 of	mind	 itself	 as	 a	 general	 capacity	 to	
receive	 impressions,	 to	 reflect,	 etc.),	 and	 the	
debate	was	not	on	whether	such	mind	exists	or	
not	(everyone	agreed	on	it)	but	on	its	relative	
importance	 in	 relation	 to	practice:	 those	who	
stressed  the  mind  and  its  liangzhi  (Lu-Wang  
school)	 laid	more	importance	on	personal	at-
tainment	 in	oneself,	whereas	 their	 opponents	
(Cheng-Zhu	school)	stressed	more	the	impor-
tance	 of	 book-learning.	And	 it	 should	 never	
be	forgotten	that	although	the	debate	became	 
 
fierce	 at	 times,	 it	 was	 all	 about	 relative im-
portance,	 because	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 final	
aim	 of	 also	 Cheng-Zhu	 school	 was	 personal	
understanding,  and  on  the  other  hand  Lu-
Wang	 school	 also	 had	 an	 educational	 curric-
ulum	with	 classical	 texts	 (which	Wang	often	
comments	 upon),	 and	Wang	Yangming	 him-
self	stressed	the	 importance	of	“investigating	
things”	 and	 “broadening	 the	 knowledge”,	
which	 of	 course	 does	 not	mean	 to	 lose	 one-
self	 in	 external	 things	 (things	 taken	 without	
their relation to the mind), but it does involve 
the  investigation  of  things  in  relation  to  the  




he investigation of things is  investigating the 
things of the mind, the things of the intention, 
and	 the	 things	 of	 knowledge.”	 (CXL	 §174,	







that	 at	 birth	 there	 are	 no	 ideas,	 but	 still	 you	
might	 know	 and	 act	 spontaneously	 in	 a	 cer-
tain	way	 in	 certain	 conditions.	 It	means	 that	
what	 is	 important	 is	 not	 the	 source	 of	 ideas	






distinct	 understandings	 of	 liangzhi in  Wang  
Yangming:	(1)	as	a	spontaneous	tendency	to-
wards	 good;	 (2)	 as	 perfectible	 consciousness	
of	the	ethical	value	of	one’s	intentions;	(3)	as	
always	 clear	 and	 perfect	 source	 of	 all	 inten-
tions;	where	the	first	two	are	empirical	and	the	




























is	 one	 of	 his	 core	 concepts	 (perhaps	 “the”	 concept	 of	Wang	Yangming),23 
found	all	over	his	later	texts,	whereas	in	Chuanxi lu 傳習錄	he	uses	“primary	
ability”	 only	 four	 times.24	However,	 the	 parallelism	between	 these	 two,	 of	
the	primary	knowledge	and	primary	capacity	for	action,	comes	out	in	two	of	
Wang	Yangming’s	central	ideas:	the	unity	of	knowledge	and	action	(zhixing 
































that	knowledge	is	 the	beginning	of	action	and	action	the	completion	of	knowledge.	If	 this	 is	
understood,	then	when	only	knowledge	is	mentioned,	action	is	included,	and	when	only	action	
is	mentioned,	knowledge	is	included.”	(CXL	§5,	WTC	11)	
which	 empirical	 “secondary	 knowledge”	 is	
derived	 by	 abstracting	 the	 objects	 of	 knowl-




18	   
Wang	Yangming	 says	 that	 the	 states	 before	
and	after	the	feelings	are	aroused/emitted	are	




19   
Ti 體	has	been	often	translated	as	“substance”	
and	 sometimes	 as	 “essence”,	 but	 they	 both	
have	 shortcomings.	 Both	 “substance”	 and	






as	 opposed	 to	 accidents,	 that	 are	 contingent.	
Ti,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  under  the  prop-
erties and through	the	changes,	but	inside the 
appearances	and	changes	themselves.	It	is	also	
not	 defined	 as	necessary  and  opposed  to  the  
contingent.	It	refers	to	the	virtual level of be-
ing,	of	which	beings	and	events	are	actualiza-
tions	or	“functionings”	(yong 用).	It	 is	of	the	
order of the veins 理	(see	Ott	2020).	Iso	Kern	
(2010:	 189–194)	 uses	 both	 of	 these	 transla-
tions	 (i.e.,	 their	 German	 equivalents	 Wesen 
and Substanz),	 tying	 them	 to	 two	 different	
meanings of ti or benti:	“original	essence”	(as	
opposed	to	impure,	obscured)	and	“substance”	
(as	 opposed	 to	 the	 “functions”	 or	 “expres-
sions”).	However,	this	distinction	is	question-
able.	Kern	says	 that:	“the	whole	set	of	prob-
lems	 reminds	 us	 of	 our	 classical	 discussions	
about	 the	 concepts	 of	 ousia, eidos, morphe, 
entelecheia	or	their	Latin	equivalents	substan-








ly	 John	Makeham	 and	 others	 have	 proposed	
to	translate	it	as	“(intrinsic)	reality”	(see,	e.g.	
Angle	 2018:	 169),	 but	 I	 find	 this	 translation	
too	vague,	and	it	has	also	problematic	etymo-




or forms (xing 形)	–	but	in	the	Chinese	tradi-
tion	 these	 belong	 to	 the	 “below-the-forms”	
(xingerxia 形而下),  and  should  be  kept  apart  
from	 the	 “above-the-forms”	 (xingershang 形
而上), that is the realm of ti.	An	always	accept-
able	alternative	is	to	simply	use	the	romaniza-
tion ti,	as	 in	Makeham	2018,	for	 instance.	In	
itself,	 the	word	 ti 體	 is	a	kind	of	“rhizomatic	
body”,	as	Deborah	Sommer	(2008,	2010)	ex-
plains	(see	also	below,	section	5).
20	   
Lichtung in	German	means	a	clearing	 in	 the	
forest,  and  Licht is  light.  There  is  a  similar  
metaphor	involved	in	Wang’s	clarity	or	bright-
ness	of	the	primary	knowledge	(see	below).
21   
The	 last	 three	metaphors	 are	 correlated:	 ac-
cording	to	an	old	metaphor	often	used	in	Bud-
dhism  and  Daoism,  mind  is  like  a  mirror  in  
the	sense	that	it	without	delay	or	discrimina-
tion	reflects	what	appears	in	front	of	it.	In	this	




and	 contemporaneous	 with	 the	 event	 itself.	
But	according	to	the	metaphor,	the	mirror	re-
flects	 only	 in	case	of	 light;	and	according	 to	
the third metaphor, the mind is brightness it-
self	that	illuminates	everything.
22   
Here	 I	 combine	 the	 translations	 of	 Leg-
ge,  available  at  https://ctext.org/mengzi?-
sea rchu=%E8%89%AF%E7%9F%A5 
(which	 is	 also	 the	 source	 of	 the	 Chinese	
original;	 accessed	 on	 3	February	 2020),	 and	
that	of	Van	Norden	(Mengzi	2008:	175).	The	
word	for	“extend”	(da 達) is not the same as 
in	Wang	Yangming’s	 “extension	 [zhi 致]  of  
knowledge”,	 taken	 from	 the	 “Great	 Learn-
ing”.	Mencius	 does	 not	 use	 the	 terms	 of	 li-











knowing	 and	 acting	 abstracts	 and	 reifies	 them.	When	we	 investigate	 them	
concretely	in	their	being,	we	find,	 like	Wang	Yangming	says,	that	an	under-
standing	or	plan	is	already	an	implicit	action,	and	action	involves	a	certain	











but	more	deeply,	 it	creates	 the	field	 itself	where	all	 the	appearing	 in	all	 its	
modes	(perceptive,	memorative,	imaginative,	etc.;	as	fulfilled	and	unfulfilled	




















Since	 the	 affirmation	 that	 knowledge	 and	 action	 are	 one	 is	 valid	 first	 and	
foremost	on	the	level	of	 the	“primary”,	 the	transcendental,	we	can	say	that	





















even	further	and	says	that	also	heaven	and	earth,	gui- and shen-spirits form 
the	same	(rhizomatic)	body	with	me.	He	explains	that	all	are	“permeated	with	
one	 energy”	 (便是一氣流通的)	 and	 that	 it	 should	 be	 considered	 “from	 the	
point	of	view	of	the	subtle	incipient	activating	force	of	their	mutual	influence	
be	 supposed	 that	 the	 adjective	 liang  had  the  
ordinary	meaning	of	‘good’.	However,	name-






23   
In	a	piece	recorded	in	the	“Omissions	from	the	
Chuanxi lu” (《傳習錄拾遺》),	 it	 is	written:	
“The	Master	once	said:	‘Since	my	experience	
at	 Longchang,	 my	 thoughts	 have	 not	 been	
outside	of	the	two	words,	liangzhi.	However,	
I	 have	 not	 been	 able	 to	 articulate	 these	 two	
words	[until	now].	So	I	have	had	to	use	many	


















24   
It	is	the	other	way	around	for	Zhang	Zai,	who	
stressed	the	primary	ability	(Chan	1963:	509).	






since	 the	 Chinese	 language	 does	 not	 mark	
gender. 
26	   
The	 expressions	 “loving	 a	 lovely	 sight”	 and	
“hating	a	hateful	odor”	are	taken	from	Tiwald	
and	Van	Norden	2014:	191.
27	   




28	   
Bergson	 has	 in	 mind	 mainly	 living	 beings,	




acts	 with	 its	 surroundings	 in	 a	 certain	 way	





























any	 knowledge	 of	 chemistry	 or	 physics,	we	 intend	 some	 parts	 of	 our	 sur-
roundings	 as	 consubstantial	with	our	own	body	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 I	 can	 as-
similate	them	through	nourishment,	or	use	them	as	medicine.	And	even	more	













alien	 to	my	body,	 for	 instance,	when	 I	have	slept	on	 it,	 and	 it	has	become	
numb.	In	principle,	this	“ability”	extends,	either	directly	or	indirectly,	to	all	
there	is,	so	that	it	is	a	fact	of	our	embodied	capacity	for	action	that	“all	things	
form	 one	 (rhizomatic)	 body”	 (a	 sensorimotor	 equivalent	 to	 the	 intentional	
“primary	world”	mentioned	above	in	section	2).
6.	Intersubjectivity	and	First-Person	Point	of	Access
We	must	 take	a	closer	 look	at	 the	“one-body”	theory,	because	Wang	Yang-






































30	   
For	 a	 discussion	 of	 this	 term	 in	 relation	 to	
Gilles	Deleuze,	see	Ott	2019.
31   
Wing-tsit	Chan’s	 translation	of	‘undifferenti-
ated’	is	not	very	good,	because	it	would	imply	
a	homogeneous	block;	 the	 things	 referred	 to	
(human	 heart-mind	 and	Heavenly	 veins)	 are	
not	undifferentiated	–	 in	 that	case	we	would	








§281),	 the	 ji seems	 to	be	 closer	 to	Zhu	Xi’s	
notion	 of	 the	 Great	 Ultimate	 and	 Deleuze’s	 
 
dark	precursor	which	 is	 the	 very	 initiator	 of	
the	actualization	process.
33   
Pronounced	 by	 his	 student	 and	 accepted	 by	
him.	 It	 refers	 to	 the	 traditional	 saying	 from	




34   
One	 of	 the	most	 radical	 expressions	 of	 it	 is	



































2003:	120).35	Thus,	when	Wang	Yangming	introduces	at	 this	point	 the	 idea	
that	all	beings	are	one	(rhizomatic)	“body”,	 it	need	not	be	taken	as	a	 lapse	
into	naïve	metaphysics,	 an	 affirmation	 about	 the	world	 independent	 of	 the	
transcendental	subjectivity,	but	 instead	 in	 the	sense	of	a	fundamental	 inter-




















What	 obscures	 the	 primary	 heart-mind	 and	 keeps	 us	 fixated	 on	 actualized	
forms	 are	 “desires”	 (yu 欲).	Desire	might	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 conatus	 that	 in-
tends	its	object	as	merely	actual,	separated	from	its	source,	its	virtuality	or	the	
“veins”	(li 理),	from	primary	knowledge	and	primary	ability.	It	is	correlated	




























35	   
One	 of	 the	most	 vivid,	 forceful	 and	 playful	
expressions	of	it	is	the	story	of	Zhuangzi	and	
Huizi	on	the	bridge	on	river	Hao,	discussing	
the	 happiness	 of	 the	 fish	 (Ch.	 17,	 see	Ames	
and	Nakajima	2015).	There	are	different	pos-
sible	interpretations	of	that	short	story,	but	it	
seems	most	 plausible	 that	 Zhuangzi	 implies	
an	 intersubjectivity	 both	with	 fellow	 human	
beings	(Huizi)	and	with	other	creatures	(fish).
36	   
Sommer  argues  that  there  are  strong  vege-
tative	 connotations	 in	 the	 ti body,	 especially	
in	 relation	 to	 the	 capacity	 for	 vegetative	 re-
production	(the	old	alternative	version	of	the	
character	is	体,	the	left	part	of	which	is	“hu-
man”	and	 the	 right	 part	 of	which	 is	 “root”):	
when	 you	 cut	 a	 potato,	 then	 each	 part	 of	 it	
with	a	node	can	give	rise	to	a	new	plant	and	
each	 of	 them	 in	 a	 sense	 is the  parent  plant.  
Humans	 can	 also	 form	 a	 ti body,	 especially	
through	ritual	consumption	of	food;	the	word	
for	“ritual”	li 禮, being often brought together 
with	 the	 ti 體;	 the	 right	part	 of	which	 is	 the	





and	 shares	 a	 fundamental	 consubstantiali-
ty	 and	 common	 identity	with	 that	whole.	Ti 
bodies	can	potentially	extend	in	all	directions	
and	can	exist	 in	multiple,	overlapping	layers	
or	 valences.	 Boundaries	 between	 valences	
are	 often	 unmarked	 or	 are	 obscure.	When	 a	
ti body	 is	 fragmented	 into	 parts	 (literally	 or	
conceptually),	 each	 part	 retains,	 in	 certain	
aspects,	 a	 kind	 of	 wholeness	 or	 becomes	 a	
simulacra	 of	 the	 larger	 entity	 of	 which	 is	 a	
constituent.”	(Sommer	2008:	294)	–	Sommer	
does	not	mention	rhizome,	but	the	multiplic-
ity,	 lack	 of	 hierarchy	 and	 univocity	 bring	 it	
close	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari’s	concept	of	the	
rhizome.	
37	   
Julia	Ching	also	speaks	about	a	“beginning”	
or	a	“starting	point”	(1976:	56,	115).




















Thus,	the	question	is	about	whether	one	“makes	a	special	effort”	(zuo 作) and 
is	“perturbed”	or	“moved”	in	one’s	energy	(dong yu qi 動於氣) or not. A sage 
takes	 the	viewpoint	of	 the	whole	of	nature	(of	everything	as	“one	body”)40 






same	 time	 there	 is	 a	 “relative	 importance	 among	 things”	 (houbao 厚薄,  lit.  
“thick	and	thin”,	CXL	276,	WTC	222;	cf.	Ching	1976:	130):
“Take	for	example	the	body,	which	is	one.	If	we	use	the	hands	and	the	feet	to	protect	the	head,	










































shan 至善 of the Great Learning)	and	perturbing	or	“moving”	the	energy	is	
absolutely	“bad”	in	the	sense	that	it	is	there	that	the	distinction	or	separation	
between	good	and	bad	is	formed:	where	my	good	is	separated from that of 
another	being,	and	reified	as	an	object	of	desire,	a	“profit”.43 This is the most 
important	task	of	self-cultivation:	to	extend	the	knowledge	(zhizhi 致知) or 
39   
The	whole	phrase	from	“to	assist…”	to	the	end	












es/tai2/ens	 (accessed	 on	 3	 February	 2020);	
caicheng 財成	 is	 equivalent	 to	 caicheng 裁
成).	Wing-tsit	Chan	has,	instead	of	the	“cours-
es	of	heaven	and	earth”,	used	another	phrase	




called	 (the	 process	 of)	 change	生生之謂易. 
This	process	of	incessant	production	happens	
through the alteration of yin-yang	which	is	the	
course	of	heaven	and	earth.”
40	   
And	 in	 this	 sense,	 she	 looks,	 in	 Spinoza’s	
terms,	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 eternity,	 sub 
specie  aeternitatis,  although  the  metaphors  




41   
In	 the	Western	 tradition,	 love	 between	 man	
and	 woman	 is	 often	 presented	 in	 a	 similar	
fashion	 as	 a	 prototype	 for	 the	 cultivation	 of	
devotion	and	of	the	“love	of	thy	neighbour”.
42   
This	 is	 the	 classical	 Confucian	 response	 to	
Mozi	 who	 expounded	 “universal	 love/care”	
and	accused	Confucians	of	being	selfish	 and	
nepotist:	 later	 Confucians	 accepted	 that	 we	
should	 care	 about	 everyone,	 but	 they	 added	
that	we	should	start	from	what	is	closer	–	and	
take	this	as	a	starting	point	for	extension.
43   








involvement  (more  for  relatives  than  strang-
ers, more for humans than animals, more for 
animals	 than	 plants,	 etc.).	 Is	 it	 ontologically	
based	on	the	“access	point”	of	my	subjectiv-
ity?	 But	 what	 determines	 the	 degree	 of	 in-
volvement?	 Some	 prior	 similarity?	But	 how	
to	justify	it	ontologically?	Or	is	it	possible	to	
found	it	upon	a	philosophy	of	difference	in	a	
Deleuzian	 sense?	 For	 the	 “maintenance”	 of	
difference,	 there	 are	 perhaps	 requirements	


















self-cultivation	program	 laid	out	 in	 the	“Great	 learning”:	 to	cultivate	one’s	
self (xiushen 修身),	rectify	one’s	heart-mind	(zhengxin 正心), make intention 








erence	 to	 one’s	 body	 and	mind”	 (其格物之功，只在身心上做,	 CXL	 §318,	
WTC 249).44	On	the	one	hand,	Wang	Yangming	does	not	stress	as	much	as	






































Primary	 knowledge	 is	 in	 itself	 perfect,	 and	 nothing	 can	 be	 added	 to	 it	 or	
subtracted	from	it.	So,	what	 is	 translated	as	“extension”	(zhi 致)46  does not 
mean	expansion	or	enlargement	of	 the	primary	knowledge	 in	 itself	but	 the	


















tension	 of	 things	 that	 one	 knows	 but	 rather	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	 aspect	 of	
mentioned	above.	My	capacity	to	differ	from	
myself	 and	 to	 “generate	 and	 regenerate”	
(shengsheng 生生)	might	need	certain	assem-
blages	with	other	humans,	and	first	 of	all,	or	
typically,	with	my	 close	 ones,	 but	 also	with	
animals,	 plants,	 stones,	 landscapes,	 etc.	Yet,	
there	seems	to	be	much	room	for	discussion.
44   
For	 a	 phenomenological	 analysis	 of	 Wang	
Yangming’s	 gewu and chengyi,  see  Dong  
2019.




we	 may	 take	 the	 “investigation	 of	 things”	
literally	 as	 the	 technical	 and	 scientific	








among	 the	 meanings	 of	 this	 word:	 “send”,	
“convey”;	 “reach”,	 “attain”;	 “pass	 on”,	
“transmit”;	 “implement”;	 “induce”;	 “cause”;	
“seek	to	obtain”,	“make	extreme	effort”;	“ex-
































self”	 (fanshen 反身,	when	 one	 “examines”	 oneself,	 in	Chan’s	 translation).	
This	is	parallel	to	Spinoza’s	saying:
“When	 the	mind	contemplates	 itself	and	 its	power	of	action,	 it	 feels	 joy.”	 (Ethics,	3p53,	my	
translation)





























of	energy	(qi 氣),	and	the	task	of	self-cultivation	is	 to	reach	for	 the	prima-
ry	knowledge	and	ability,	to	“extend	the	knowledge	and	investigate	things”	
(zhizhigewu 致知格物).	 “To	 extend”	does	 not	mean	 to	 enlarge	 in	 scope	or	
volume	but	to	clear	the	obscurity,	“to	let	shine	through”.	“To	investigate”	does	
not	mean	 to	 lose	oneself	 in	external	 things,	but	 to	 take	 them	together	with	
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Margus Ott
Pojmovi prvobitno znanje i
prvobitna sposobnost kod Wanga Yangminga
Sažetak
Rad najprije utvrđuje da iz pojma prvobitnog znanja (liangzhi	良知) Wanga Yangminga王陽明 
(1472. – 1529.) ne slijedi subjektivni idealizam te da je vezan za transcendentalnu subjektivnost 
u smislu fenomenologije. Zatim, raspravlja se o pitanju ima li Wang pojam prvobitne sposob-
nosti (liangneng 良能). Argumentira se da se može naći u dvije glavne Wangove teme – »znanje 
i radnja jedno su« (zhixing	heyi	知行合一) te »razmatrati Nebo i Zemlju i mnoštvo stvari kao 
jedno (rizomatično) tijelo« (以天地萬物為一體) ili ih smatrati »izvorno jednim s mojim (rizo-
matičnim) tijelom« (本吾一體). Pokazuje se da su prvobitno znanje i sposobnost dva aspekta 
isto fenomena. Istinito je na razini virtualnog »rizomatskog tijela« (ti 體), a ne na razini stvari 
razmatranih kao potpuno oblikovane i aktualizirane (xing	形), kako se pojavljuju u empirijskom 
umu, zamagljeni žudnjama (yu	欲) koje postaju fiksirane na razini aktualnog. Te se žudnje mogu 
razriješiti putem »proširenja (prvobitnog) znanja« zhi	(liang)zhi	致(良)知. Usporedni pojam 
»proširenja (prvobitne) sposobnosti« (zhi	liangneng	致良能), koji Wang Yangming ne koristi, 









ursprüngliches Können bei Wang Yangming
Zusammenfassung
Die Arbeit stellt zunächst fest, aus dem Begriff des ursprünglichen Wissens (liangzhi	良知) bei 
Wang Yangming 王 陽 明 (1472–1529) folgt es nicht ein subjektiven Idealismus und mit der 
transzendentalen Subjektivität im phänomenologischen Sinne zusammenhängt. Als Nächstes 
wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Wang den Begriff des ursprünglichen Könnens (liangneng 良
能) verwendet. Es wird argumentiert, dass er sich in Wangs zwei Hauptthemen finden lässt 
– „Wissen und Handeln sind eine Einheit“ (zhixing	heyi	知行合一) wie auch in „Himmel und 
Erde und unzählige Dinge als einen (rhizomatischen) Körper betrachten“ (以天地萬物為一體) 
oder sie als die „ursprüngliche Einheit mit meinem (rhizomatischen) Körper“ ansehen (本吾
一體). Es stellt sich heraus, dass das ursprüngliche Wissen und Können zwei Aspekte dessel-
ben Phänomens sind. Die Wahrhaftigkeit befindet sich auf der Ebene des virtuellen „rhizoma-
tischen Körpers“  (ti  體) und nicht auf der Ebene der Dinge, die als vollständig geformt und 
aktualisiert aufgefasst werden (xing	形), wie sie in der empirischen Vernunft in Erscheinung 
treten, getrübt vom Begehren (yu	欲), das auf der Ebene des Aktuellen fixiert wird. Dieses 
Begehren kann durch die „Erweiterung des (ursprünglichen) Wissens“ (zhi	(liang)zhi	致(良)
知) verworfen werden. Der parallele Begriff „Erweiterung des (ursprünglichen) Könnens“ 






Les concepts de connaissance innée et
de faculté innée chez Wang Yangming
Résumé
Dans un premier temps, ce travail démontre que du concept de connaissance primaire 	(liangzhi	
良知) de Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472–1529) ne s’ensuit pas l’idéalisme subjectif et qu’il est 
en lien avec la subjectivité transcendantale au sens phénoménologique. Ensuite, la question de 
savoir si la philosophie de Wang Yangming contient le concept de pouvoir primaire (liangneng 
良能) est abordée. Il est argumenté qu’il est possible de le retrouver au sein de deux notions 
élaborées par Wang Yangming – « la connaissance et l’action ne font qu’un » (zhixing	heyi	知行
合一) et « considerer le Ciel et la Terre et la multitude des choses comme corps (rhizomatique) 
» (以天地萬物為一體) – ou considérer qu’ils « font originellement un avec mon corps (rhizo-
matique) » (本吾一體). Il est démontré que la connaissance primaire et la faculté primaire sont 
deux aspects du même phénomène. C’est vrai au niveau virtuel du « corps rhizomatique » (ti 
體), et non pas au niveau des choses considérées comme formées et actualisées (xing	形) dans 
leur totalité, telles qu’elles apparaissent dans la raison empirique obscurcie par les désirs (yu	
欲) qui se fixent au niveau de l’actuel. Il est possible de se défaire de ces désirs par « extension 
de la connaissance (primaire) (zhi	(liang)zhi	致(良)知). Le concept comparatif de « extension 
de la connaissance (primaire) » (zhi	liangneng	致良能), qui n’est pas présent chez Wang Yang-
ming, peut être introduit dans son système. 
Mots-clés
Wang	Yangming,	 philosophie	 chinoise,	 intentionnalité,	 liangzhi,	 connaissance	 innée,	 faculté	
innée,	anthropocentrisme,	intersubjectivité
